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1 Introduction
The market for corporate control is an important element of corporate governance (e.g.,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Particularly active markets have been described for the US
(e.g., Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell et al., 1988) and the UK (Franks and Mayer,
1990). To a large extent these markets are based on hostile takeovers. Focusing solely on
hostile takeovers, there is no market for corporate control in the bank-based economies
of Continental Europe (OECD, 1998), in particular not in Germany (Franks and Mayer,
1998). For Germany, this lack is typically attributed to bank voting power, complex ow-
nership structures, and political resistance. This study shows that control transfers in
Germany occur more frequently than often assumed, and that there are some indications
characterizing these control transfers as disciplinary.
Since hostile takeovers are rare, we use a broader concept to examine takeover activi-
ty, namely the market for large share blocks. While this approach does not distinguish
between hostile and friendly takeovers, it does account for partial firm sales. The ap-
parent drawback of analyzing both forms of takeovers in combination is insignificant in
light of Schwert (2000). He shows for the US that hostile and friendly takeovers are not
distinguishable in economic terms, but negotiations are publicized earlier in hostile tran-
sactions. Our approach – tracking block ownership through time to identify changes in
corporate control – is supported by Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) who apply a similar
methodology to assemble case-study evidence on (hostile) stake building in Germany.
The following analysis addresses two main questions. First, we investigate how frequent-
ly corporate ownership changes. This involves tracking the names of all large investors
in almost 1,000 listed and non-listed German companies through the years 1987–1994.
We find that trading activity of large blocks is similar to other countries, and that the
vast majority of block trades leads to changes in ultimate ownership (control transfers).
Second, we examine both the causes and consequences of control transfers. They are more
likely for firms with high leverage, while they are less likely for larger firms and firms with
high ownership concentration. In addition, high insider ownership and complex ownership
structures make control transfers less likely for listed and non-listed firms, respectively.
Changes in ownership are also more likely when performance is very poor, but only for
listed firms. Control transfers are followed by increased management turnover, and for
listed firms also by asset divestitures and employee layoffs. We do not find evidence that
changes in control are related to significant improvements in performance.
Related work exists for the US. Bethel et al. (1998) investigate the antecedents and
effects of block purchases executed by activist shareholders. Their results suggest that
these partial firm purchases play an important role in limiting agency costs. Denis and
Sarin (1999) find that a substantial fraction of US firms exhibits large changes in ownership
and board structure, and show, based on case study evidence, that these changes are
typically followed by large-scale asset reallocations. Denis and Kruse (2000) analyze the
consequences of disciplinary events such as takeovers and find a substantial amount of
corporate restructuring and improvements in operating performance.
This study extends the literature in several ways. First, it provides large-sample evidence
on causes as well as consequences of control transfers, and hence complements the work
of Denis and Sarin (1999) and Denis and Kruse (2000). In contrast to Bethel et al. (1998)
we focus on purchases of blocks that are likely to change corporate control, and thus make
our analysis less vulnerable to potentially misspecified shareholder types. Second, previous
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studies focus on the market-based economy of the US, while this study examines a bank-
based economy. The German economy is particularly interesting for analyzing changes
in ownership because ownership structures are highly complex and therefore perceived
to be stable. One reason for this assumption is the wide-spread use of such forms of
organization as pyramids, cross ownership, and large conglomerates (e.g., La Porta et al.,
1999). Third, since the majority of companies in Continental Europe and particularly in
Germany is not listed on a stock exchange, this study covers listed as well as non-listed
firms. Previous studies examining control transfers focus exclusively on listed firms, and
so far nothing is known about control transfers in non-listed firms. Fourth, due to the
complexity of ownership structures in Germany, analyzing direct share ownership is not
sufficient. We therefore examine ultimate ownership of firms. As this approach requires
data on individual shareholders, our analysis also accounts for changes within shareholder
categories, and in this sense extends the work of Denis and Sarin (1999) that is based
on changes between shareholder categories. This is essential because positive and negative
gross changes in a category might offset each other, causing them to be neglected.
The study proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the evidence on the market
for large share blocks and draws on the relevant theoretical and empirical literature to
formulate a set of hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data used for this study and defines
the concept of control that is applied to identify the ultimate owner. Section 4 describes
the frequency of control transfers in Germany as well as the type of buyers and sellers of
control blocks. Section 5 analyzes the causes and consequences of control transfers and
tests the hypotheses put forward in Section 2. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature and hypotheses
Evidence on the market for large share blocks is accumulating. For Belgium, Renneboog
(2000) reports 127 cases in which blocks larger than ten percent are purchased during
the years 1989–1994. For a sample of over 1,000 firm years, this implies that on average
12.4% of Belgian firms experienced such a block purchase in any year. For the UK, the
corresponding annual rate is 9.0% (Franks et al., 1999). For the US, Bethel et al. (1998)
find 244 purchases of blocks larger than five percent during the years 1980–1989. For
a sample of almost 3,700 firm years, this translates into an annual rate of 6.6%. For
Germany, so far no comparable figure on block trading is available. Franks and Mayer
(1994) compare the ownership structures of 171 listed German companies for the years
1988 and 1991. They find that in about a fifth of firms a new major shareholder is in place
by 1991. Although their analysis is conducted on the basis of direct ownership and changes
in ultimate ownership are neglected, their results suggest that there is a market for large
share blocks in Germany. Similarly, recent case-study evidence collected by Jenkinson
and Ljungqvist (2001) indicates that control changes in Germany are more frequent than
previously assumed. While their study focuses on hostile control transactions and neglects
cases without perceived hostility, their methodology – tracking block ownership through
time – appears to be crucial to identifying changes in control.
We now turn to the literature on causes and consequences of ownership changes to
formulate two sets of hypotheses. The first set focuses on the causes and distinguishes
between firm-specific and owner-specific characteristics as well as performance.
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Hypothesis 1 Changes in ultimate ownership are less likely for firms with high concen-
tration of ownership.
Hypothesis 2 Changes in ultimate ownership are more likely for firms with high lever-
age.
Hypothesis 3 Changes in ultimate ownership are less likely for firms with complex ow-
nership structures.
Hypothesis 4 Changes in ultimate ownership are less likely for large firms.
Hypothesis 5 Changes in ultimate ownership are less likely for firms with high insider
ownership.
Hypothesis 6 Changes in ultimate ownership are more likely for firms with poor perfor-
mance.
The first hypothesis (H1) follows Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1993) who argue that takeovers
require low concentration of ownership and, in turn, high market liquidity because only
then are capital markets able to determine the necessity of a takeover. The few cases of
hostile takeovers in Germany support Holmstro¨m and Tirole because in all cases the shares
of the takeover target were widely dispersed. Note that Grossman and Hart (1980) argue
to the opposite that some share concentration is required for takeovers to be effective
because under dispersed ownership shareholders would prefer to free-ride.
The second hypothesis (H2) is derived from Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) who argue
that changes in the firm’s growth opportunities, leverage, or firm size could make adjust-
ments in ownership necessary, for example as a result of economic shocks to an industry.
Consistent with this view, Zingales (1998) reports that following deregulation in the US
trucking industry firms faced increasing leverage, and that this has lead to a higher proba-
bility of market exit. We expect leverage to have a similar impact on changes in ownership.
The third and fourth hypothesis consider firm-specific characteristics that might deter
changes in ownership. The third hypothesis (H3) focuses on defensive mechanisms im-
plemented against a change in ownership. In the US, defensive mechanisms encompass
employee stock ownership plans, anti-takeover charter amendments, and poison pills, as
noted by Bethel et al. (1998). In Germany, pyramids (Franks and Mayer, 1995) and cross-
holding of shares (Wenger and Kaserer, 1998) are likely to hinder ownership changes.
The fourth hypothesis (H4) establishes that also the size of a firm can deter changes in
ownership. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that the market for corporate control is less
liquid as firm size increases. Bethel et al. (1998) and Mulherin and Boone (2000) provide
empirical evidence that smaller firms are more likely to become takeover targets.
The fifth hypothesis (H5) emphasizes owner-specific characteristics, in particular the
fraction of shares owned by insiders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that incentives of
managers and owners are better aligned when managers hold a large fraction of shares.
In this case outside investors should have little opportunity to improve on performance.
However, managers might also become entrenched when owning large blocks (Fama and
Jensen, 1983). Irrespective whether insider ownership is good or bad for shareholders, we
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expect high insider ownership to reduce the likelihood of a control change. This conjecture
is in line with evidence on the US (Barber et al., 1995) and Canada (St-Pierre et al., 1996).
Finally, the sixth hypothesis (H6) focuses on performance. When managers diverge
from the interest of shareholders and performance suffers, both the market for corporate
control as well as internal control mechanisms could act as disciplining devices (e.g.,
Jensen, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Denis and Sarin (1999) and Maksimovic and
Phillips (2001) provide empirical evidence for the US. Hence, irrespective of the causes of
bad performance, we expect that poor performance makes block purchases more likely.
The second set of hypotheses concerns the consequences of ownership changes. We focus
on three aspects: governance changes, corporate restructuring, and performance.
Hypothesis 7 Changes in ultimate ownership are followed by increased management tur-
nover.
Hypothesis 8 Changes in ultimate ownership are followed by increased asset divestitu-
res, employee layoffs, and cost cutting.
Hypothesis 9 Changes in ultimate ownership are followed by improvements in perfor-
mance.
The seventh hypothesis (H7) follows from considerations that takeovers can be discipli-
nary, and that different management teams compete with each other (Jensen and Ruback,
1983). The empirical evidence suggests that changes in board and ownership structure are
strongly related to top executive turnover and prior performance (e.g., Denis and Sarin,
1999, and Kole and Lehn, 1999, for the US; Renneboog, 2000, for Belgium). For Germany,
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) report that following hostile control changes typically
incumbent management is removed or resigns.
The eighth hypothesis (H8) is concerned with three different aspects of corporate re-
structuring as a consequence of a change in ownership: asset divestitures, employee layoffs,
and cost cutting. Previous empirical studies find that following changes in ownership as-
set divestitures increase, the frequency of mergers and acquisitions decreases, and share
repurchases increase (e.g., Bethel et al., 1998, and Denis and Sarin, 1999, for the US;
Franks and Mayer, 1995, for the UK).
Finally, the ninth hypothesis (H9) establishes that changes in ownership ultimately
affect performance. Bethel et al. (1998) show that industry-adjusted operating profitability
rises in firms that experience activist block purchases, whereas it falls in firms that do
not experience a block purchase. Denis and Kruse (2000) find for a sample of firms that
experienced a large performance decline that industry-adjusted operating performance
improves significantly in combination with major asset restructuring.
3 Data and measurement issues
The sample used in this analysis is based on firm-level data for the years 1987–1994. It
comprises firms with headquarters located in Germany. Companies from former Eastern
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Germany are included only after 1990. Contrary to previous empirical studies on corporate
governance in Germany (e.g., Cable, 1985; Becht and Bo¨hmer, 2000; Gorton and Schmid,
2000) we do not restrict our analysis to large listed firms; we also examine non-listed and
medium-sized firms, part of which are subsidiaries of conglomerates. This is significant
because focusing only on listed firms could cause a selection bias (Bo¨rsch-Supan and Ko¨ke,
2000). Also, in contrast to previous studies the sample encompasses firms from a broader
range of industries, including manufacturing, construction, and trade.
3.1 Sample selection
The analysis of the market for corporate control as a governance device places several
major requirements on the data set used. First, the firms in the sample need to face the
classical agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is the case when the manager
of a firm does not own one hundred percent of the shares. Otherwise, no separation of
ownership and control would exist and agency costs would be zero by definition. To meet
this requirement we select only medium-sized and large German corporations because we
expect agency problems to be most severe there.
Second, to assess the performance of firms we collect balance sheet data and capital mar-
ket data. This is necessary because theory provides little guidance on which performance
measure to use. Third, ownership data are a crucial element of the data set. As shown
by Wenger and Kaserer (1998), Bo¨hmer (2000), and Ko¨ke (2001), ownership structures
of large German firms are complex. Firms are often owned by pyramids of shareholders
or cross shareholdings. To account for these conditions, the analysis of direct ownership
(Gorton and Schmid, 2000) must be extended to the analysis of ultimate ownership (see
Section 3.3). Fourth, any consequences of changes in ownership are likely to be most visi-
ble through governance changes and various corporate restructuring activities. Therefore,
data on board structure, asset divestitures, employment, and labor costs are included.
In total, the analysis of the frequency of control transfers (Section 4) is based on data
from 946 firms (4,882 firm years) for the years 1987–1994. This sample (in the following,
Sample I) includes firms with at least two continuous years of data because changes in
ownership must be calculated. The analysis of causes and consequences of control trans-
fers (Section 5) is based on a subsample and encompasses data from 664 firms (4,433
firm years). This sample (in the following, Sample II) includes firms with at least four
continuous years of data because the analysis of consequences of control transfers requi-
res data on the year prior and the two years after change in ownership. In Section 3.2
we investigate whether dropping firms with fewer continuous years of data introduces a
selection bias, particularly which variables are most likely to be affected.
The sample is fairly representative for the universe of large German corporations. Taking
the number of all incorporated German firms in the year 1992 as a reference, coverage is
high for listed firms (66.6%), all of which are public corporations (Table 1).1 For non-listed
firms, coverage is small for public corporations (13.9%) and weak for private corporations
(0.03%). Controlling for firm size, the sample includes 48% of all public corporations with
total sales exceeding 100 million DM, and more than three percent of large private cor-
porations. This study does not distinguish between private and public firms because they
1 The database includes all firms listed on any German stock exchange that do not belong to the finan-
cial industry and industries under strict regulation such as utility, traffic, and telecommunications
(see Appendix).
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are similar in many regulatory characteristics (e.g., liability status, publication require-
ments, and taxation).2 Industry coverage is sufficiently representative for manufacturing
industries. There is also a significant number of firms operating in other industries, for
example in wholesale trade and construction. Details on sample selection and data sources
used are provided in the Appendix.
3.2 Characteristics of entering and exiting firms
In the following we examine whether our sample systematically excludes some type of
firms. For example, if poor performance increased the likelihood of firm failure or takeover,
the sample could contain systematically fewer poorly performing firms. This would bias
any observed correlation of performance and the likelihood of a control transfer. We
choose two approaches to analyze sample composition. First, we check whether Sample
II, which is used for the analysis of causes and consequences of control transfers (Section
5), systematically excludes some type of firms. Second, we examine what kind of firms
enter and exit the full sample (Sample I) during the years 1987–1994.
We compare Sample I with Sample II, which contain firms with at least two and at least
four continuous years of data, respectively, on some key firm characteristics, separately for
listed and non-listed firms (Table 2). For nearly all firm characteristics we find no signifi-
cant differences except for ownership concentration being significantly smaller in Sample
II for non-listed firms. This could be due to the fact that Hoppenstedt, the data provider,
strongly increased coverage of non-listed subsidiary companies in the early 1990s. As the-
se firms typically show very high ownership concentration, Sample I contains relatively
more firms with few observations and high concentration. Next, we compare firms with
at least four continuous years of data (Sample II) with firms that have fewer than four
observations. Again we find that for non-listed firms ownership concentration is smaller
in Sample II. In addition, Sample II contains fewer non-listed firms with a large burden
of debt, poor performance, and smaller firm size. For listed firms, we find no systematic
difference between the two samples except for firm size, which is larger in Sample II.
Table 3 shows whether firms that enter Sample I after 1987, the first year of the sample,
or exit before 1994, the last year of the sample, are systematically different from other
firms. For firms entering in year t, the comparison group is firms in year t that are in
the sample at least since year t − 1. Vice versa, for firms exiting at the end of year t,
the comparison group is firms in year t that are still in the sample in year t + 1. On
average across all sample years, we find that non-listed firms show higher shareholder
concentration, a larger burden of debt, and smaller firm size when they enter the sample.
In addition, a comparably large fraction of entering non-listed firms reports earnings losses.
Exiting non-listed firms are also smaller in size and more indebted than firms remaining
in the sample. For listed firms we find that ownership concentration is larger, firm size is
smaller, and performance is better when they enter the sample. Exiting listed firms are
smaller in size. All results are qualitatively similar at the median (not reported).
The lesson from this sample composition analysis is that comparing sample averages of
shareholder concentration year by year could be misleading because entering firms show,
2 One major difference between private (GmbH) and public corporations (AG) is that in private cor-
porations the general meeting of shareholders can give instructions to management, but not in public
corporations. Therefore, management could in principle be under tighter control in GmbH firms.
This difference is unlikely to be of major relevance in our sample because ownership concentration
is high for both types of firms.
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on average, higher concentration than firms already in the sample. Regarding the other
characteristics, it is possible that Sample II is somewhat biased towards well-performing
firms, however only for non-listed firms. Overall, a systematic bias due to sample attrition
appears to be unlikely because, with the exception of firm size, exiting firms are not
significantly different from other sample firms. This result could be expected because 60%
of sample exits are cases of non-reporting due to name changes, and not due to failure or
acquisition (see Appendix).
3.3 Concept of control
A source of dispute in early empirical studies on the relation between ownership and
performance has been the definition of corporate control. One approach is to classify
companies into either manager-controlled or owner-controlled firms (Short, 1994). This
classification is to some extent arbitrary. Using continuous ownership variables based
upon the fraction of share ownership or voting rights is a more precise measure of direct
ownership. However, both approaches do not capture the effects of complex ownership
structures. For Germany such analysis of direct ownership is therefore not sufficient. By
using the concept of ultimate ownership it becomes possible to define corporate control
within complex ownership structures. This requires the analysis of control chains throug-
hout several levels and the identification of a most powerful ultimate owner if any such
exists. We use the concept of ultimate ownership in this study.
The identification of the ultimate owner for each firm is based upon German corporate
law and involves two steps. First, we identify the ultimate owner for each direct shareholder
using the following three rules. Rule 1 (strong ownership rule): A chain of control is
pursued to the next level if the shareholder being analyzed is owned to 50% or more by
a shareholder on the next level, while all other shareholders on the next level own less
than 50%. Rule 2 (weak ownership rule): If rule 1 does not apply, a chain of control is
pursued to the next level if the shareholder being analyzed is owned to 25% or more by
a shareholder on the next level, while all other shareholders on the next level own less
than 25%. Rule 3 (stop rule): If neither rule 1 nor rule 2 applies, a chain of control is not
pursued further. These rules guarantee that no more than one ultimate owner is identified
for each direct shareholder. Note that if a shareholder has split his ownership stake in a
particular company into several smaller stakes, for example into two blocks of 50% held by
two subsidiary firms, we combine these smaller stakes into one single block. We set the first
cutoff point at 50% because German law allows an investor owning 50% of all shares to
appoint management.3 The second cutoff point is set at 25% because an investor owning
25% of the shares has the right to veto decisions. In a second step in determining the
ultimate owner for each sample firm, we apply the three rules to all direct shareholders.
This allows to identify one single shareholder that is in ultimate control. When no single
shareholder fulfills the criteria, this firm is seen to have no ultimate owner.
For illustration, consider the example of Dornier Aeronautics GmbH, a non-listed medium-
sized firm in the aeronautics industry (Fig. 1). In the year 1992 it is one hundred percent
owned by Dornier GmbH, the direct shareholder (level 1). In turn, Dornier GmbH is owned
by the Dornier family (42.4%) and by Deutsche Aerospace AG (57.6%)(level 2). This lat-
ter firm is part of the Daimler-Benz AG conglomerate structure, being owned with 83.0%
3 A 50% majority is sufficient to dismiss management after their regular period of office. But a majority
of 75% is required to dismiss management during its period of office (§103 (1) AktG).
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by the automobile giant (level 3). Daimler-Benz AG itself is in the hands of Deutsche
Bank AG (28.2%), Mercedes Automobil-Holding AG (25.2%), and the Emirate of Kuwait
(14%). The rest of the shares is dispersed. Applying our concept of control, we find a con-
tinuous chain of majority stakes between Dornier Aeronautics GmbH and Daimler-Benz
AG, but several shareholders owning minority stakes larger than 25% in Daimler-Benz
AG. Hence, we identify Daimler-Benz AG on the third level in the ownership structure
as the ultimate owner of Dornier Aeronautics GmbH.
In addition to our concept of control, two main alternatives of how to define ultimate
ownership are conceivable. One possibility is to pursue each ownership chain to its end,
multiply the individual share blocks along the way, and compare the shareholders at the
end of each chain by size of the resulting product of ownership blocks. In the above
example this implies that Dornier Aeronautics GmbH would be ultimately owned by the
Dornier family (42.4%), Deutsche Bank AG (13.5%), Mercedes Automobil Holding AG
(12.0%), the Emirate of Kuwait (6.7%), and many small shareholders. Hence, Dornier
Aeronautics GmbH would be seen to have at least four ultimate owners, each controlling
Dornier Aeronautics GmbH with a certain probability. Another alternative is to assume
that shareholders on higher levels of the ownership structure cannot influence decisions at
the base level, for example due to information asymmetries or transaction costs. In this
case Dornier GmbH is identified as the single ultimate owner.
Both alternatives have weaknesses. For the first alternative, information on the complete
control chains of all direct shareholders is required. In most cases this information is availa-
ble only for the largest shareholders. The second alternative depends on the assumption
of complete dilution of control in pyramid structures. The large number of conglomerate
firms in Germany with up to six or more layers of ownership suggests that pyramids are
attractive forms of organization. Hence, control is unlikely to be fully diluted in pyra-
mids. Our concept of control overcomes these weaknesses and combines advantages of
both alternatives: clear identification of one single ultimate owner and the incorporation
of complex ownership structures.
Our concept of control could be subject to potential bias because it is based on offici-
ally reported ownership rights instead of voting rights.4 Ownership rights do not need to
coincide perfectly with voting rights. There are two main reasons for this. First, shares
might have voting caps or carry multiple voting rights. Second, shares that are officially
reported as dispersed might be under de facto control of banks because the German sy-
stem of proxy voting gives banks the right to execute voting rights of deposited shares.
Unless shareholders have given instructions, banks can multiply their influence this way.
We believe that these weaknesses are unlikely to produce a systematic bias. Although legal
during 1987–1994, limitations on voting rights do not seem to be widespread. Gorton and
Schmid (2000) report that only 14 of the largest German firms had voting rights restricti-
ons. Hence, in the vast majority of sample firms voting rights do coincide with ownership
rights. As for proxy voting, recent evidence suggests that proxy voting is extremely un-
likely to enhance German banks’ voting power considerably (Edwards and Nibler, 2000).
In addition, only few of our sample firms have a widely dispersed shareholder base, which
is the precondition for bank voting power based on proxy rights. Hence, proxy voting is
4 Note that information on voting rights, as provided by the German Securities Exchange Commis-
sion (BAWe) and used in the study of Becht and Bo¨hmer (2000), is preferable to pure ownership
information. But this information is available only from 1996 onwards, and the methodology applied
by the BAWe to attribute voting rights in complex ownership structures has serious drawbacks, as
shown by Becht and Bo¨hmer.
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unlikely to significantly bias our concept of control. We recognize, however, that investors
identified as ultimate owners at higher levels in the ownership structure might also be
subject to proxy voting by banks.
4 Frequency of control transfers
In this section we describe the frequency of control transactions in Germany as well as the
type of buyers and sellers of control blocks. We analyze changes in aggregate measures
of ownership (Section 4.1) and changes in individual shareholders (Section 4.2). We show
that ownership structures are not constant over time.
4.1 Evidence based on aggregate measures
If concentration of ownership changes over time, this can be a first indication that ow-
nership structures are not constant. Table 4 examines this issue for three measures of
concentration. We consider the size of the largest block, the sum of the three largest
blocks, and the fraction of firms that are under ultimate control according to our concept
of control. Table 4 reports average concentration over the years 1987–1994.
Table 4 shows that ownership concentration is large, irrespective of the measure applied.
For listed firms, the average size of the largest block is 60.6%, and for non-listed firms it
is even larger with 85.9%. The figure for listed firms closely resembles the figure of 58.9%
reported by Becht and Bo¨hmer (2000), which is based on voting rights and calculated as
the average for all listed firms in 1996. The similarity of these two figures suggests that
the concept of control as applied in this study is indeed a suitable methodological tool
to reconstruct voting hierarchies based on information of direct ownership rights. Note
also that the two other concentration measures are highly correlated with our measure of
control.
Furthermore, Table 4 suggests that ownership concentration has been increasing during
the years 1987–1994. While the average size of the largest block in listed firms is 53.1%
in 1987, it constantly increases to 61.9% in 1994. An analogous increase can be observed
for non-listed firms. One reason for increasing average concentration could be that old
shareholders or incoming new shareholders purchase shares from other shareholders hol-
ding smaller stakes. But as argued in Section 3.2, this observed increase could also be an
artefact because firms entering the sample show, on average, higher concentration than
firms already in the sample. The case of ownership concentration illustrates that it can be
difficult to infer changes in disaggregate measures from changes in aggregate measures.
Another aggregate figure commonly used to describe ownership structures is the dis-
tribution of shares controlled by different shareholder types. Following the empirical li-
terature, we define five shareholder types: individuals, financial firms (banks, insurance
companies, and investment funds), non-financial firms, government, as well as dispersed
shares. For individuals, we distinguish between directors (insiders) that play a particular
role in governing a corporation and individuals not related to the firm. Partnerships are
included in the category ’individuals’ because in Germany managers of these firms are
usually identical with their owners. Hence no additional agency problem exists.
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Table 5 classifies all direct share blocks, which are assigned to the type of their ultimate
owner, into these five ownership categories. For listed firms, we find that individuals
(36.8%) and non-financial firms (24%) ultimately control the largest fraction of shares.
Financial firms own about nine percent of shares, with banks owning a larger fraction than
insurance companies, with 7.3% and 1.8% respectively (not tabled). About 32% of the
shares of listed firms are not owned by any large shareholder (dispersed), and about 10%
for non-listed firms. The role of banks as ultimate owners appears to be limited compared
to the central role they are often assumed to play in corporate Germany. But as argued
in Section 3.3, the influence of banks is hard to capture based solely on shares directly
owned because the German system of proxy voting potentially enhances their influence. A
theoretical upper limit of bank voting power can be calculated by attributing all dispersed
shares to banks. For listed firms, according to Table 5 this would enable German banks
to cast votes for at most about 39% of all shares in listed firms.
Similar to concentration of ownership, a changing distribution of shares across sharehol-
der types could also indicate changes in ownership structure. Examining sample averages
year by year we find that the fraction of shares controlled by non-financial firms and
individuals increases, for non-listed firms and listed firms respectively. At the same time,
the fraction of dispersed shares declines considerably for both listed and non-listed firms.
One interpretation could be that dispersed shares are purchased by either individuals or
non-financial firms. But as shown in Section 3.2, entering firms typically have a lower
fraction of dispersed shares. Again this suggests that aggregate measures are less useful
to determine changes in disaggregate measures.
4.2 Evidence based on changes in individual shareholders
In contrast to evidence based on ownership changes between shareholder categories, as
discussed in the previous section, this section takes into account ownership changes within
shareholder categories. With data on individual shareholders it is possible to overcome
the weaknesses of evidence based on aggregate measures of ownership, which result from
changing sample composition. Applying our concept of control, we identify the ultimate
owner of each direct shareholder. Then we compare the names of those ultimate owners
year by year and aggregate annual changes in individual shareholders into three categories:
(1) the increase of shares held by new shareholders, (2) the increase of shares held by old
shareholders, and (3) the decrease of shares held by old shareholders.
For better illustration, consider the following example (Fig. 2). In the year 1990, Boge
AG, a large non-listed firm in the rubber industry, is owned by four large shareholders.
Applying the concept of control, we identify Carlo de Benedetti as the ultimate owner of
Boge AG. In the year 1991, Mannesmann AG becomes the new ultimate owner of VDO
Adolf Schindling AG, a direct shareholder of Boge AG. For Boge AG this implies a decrease
of 20.1% by an old shareholder (the Schindling-Rheinberger family), and an increase of
20.1% by a new shareholder (Mannesmann AG). Note that de Benedetti remains the
ultimate owner of Boge AG. In the year 1992, Mannesmann AG acquires almost all shares
of Boge AG, becoming its new ultimate owner. This implies a decrease of 74.3% by old
shareholders, and an increase of 80.4% by an old shareholder.
Table 6 shows that in listed firms, on average in any given year, 4.4% of shares are
purchased by new shareholders during 1987–1994. Old shareholders increase their invest-
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ment by 1.5%, and old shareholders decrease their investment by 5.4%.5 For non-listed
firms, average figures are very similar. Statistically, the difference between both types
of firms is not significant. Hence, there is a significant market for large share blocks in
Germany, both for listed and non-listed firms.
An interesting feature of this market is that there is large variation over time (Table 6).
During the period of observation, boom times of large block trading are the years 1987,
1989, 1990, and 1994. This variation is reflected both in increases by new shareholders
and decreases by old shareholders, and both for listed and non-listed firms. Therefore it
is unlikely to be driven by variation in the fraction of dispersed shares. One reason for
increased transaction activity is privatization. In 1990, the year of German reunificati-
on, privatization of formerly state-owned enterprises accounts for about ten percent of
all transactions. But also the purchase of large conglomerates with many subsidiaries is
important. When Feldmu¨hle Nobel AG was acquired by VEBA AG in a hostile takeover
during the year 1989, VEBA AG also became the ultimate owner of another four non-
listed firms in our sample. And when Metallgesellschaft AG came into trouble in 1993, it
had to sell five subsidiaries contained in the sample to other industrial companies.
In the remaining part of this section we analyze these block transactions in depth. First,
we look at their frequency and the size of traded blocks. Second, we examine block trading
with respect to the identity of block traders. The sample encompasses 2,422 firm years
for non-listed firms and 2,460 firm years for listed firms. This is the total number of cases
in which block trading could occur. For listed firms, in 258 cases (10.5% on average in
any given year) we observe that a block is purchased by a new shareholder. For non-listed
firms, the respective rate of block purchases is lower with 7.3%. Table 7 shows the size
distribution of blocks purchased by new shareholders. For listed firms, the purchased block
is equal or exceeds 50% in 107 cases (41.5%). In 62 cases, the new shareholder purchases
25% or more but less than 50%. In sum this means that in 169 cases (65.5%) an incoming
shareholder acquires a stake of at least 25%. This strongly suggests that new shareholders
come in because they want to take over control of the respective firm.
To put these results into perspective, we compare the frequency of block purchases with
results from previous studies. For listed firms, we find that a new shareholder purchases
a block larger than ten percent in 9.9% of sample firms, on average in any given year.
This rate of block purchases compares to 12.4% for Belgium (Renneboog, 2000) and 9.0%
for the UK (Franks et al., 1999). For the US, Bethel at al. (1998) report a rate of 6.6%
for blocks larger than five percent. Hence, the frequency of block transfers in Germany
is similar to other countries. For non-listed firms, the respective annual rate is 7.0%;
however, no comparable figures from other countries are available.
As exemplified by the case of Boge AG (Fig. 2), the transfer of a large block (partial
firm sale) does not need to be associated with a transfer of control over the entire firm.
An example of this is a new shareholder purchasing a large block, while the majority of
shares remains in the hands of the ultimate owner. To identify transfers of control we
check for name changes of the ultimate owner. We find that a change in control takes
place in 205 cases in listed firms (8.3% on average in any given year), and in 146 cases in
non-listed firms (6.0%).6 Hence, the frequency of control transfers is considerably higher
5 The sum of increases of old and new shareholders does not need to be equal to the decrease of old
shareholders because free-floating shares are not counted as held by a blockholder.
6 Overall, 73.2% of sample firms do not experience any change in control. For about 20% of firms
the ultimate owner changes once, for about six percent twice. Hence, several consecutive changes in
control are not very likely.
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than suggested by the average size of blocks traded (Table 6), but lower than suggested
by the number of blocks traded. We conclude that not all block transfers lead to control
transfers, but that a large part does.
To see whether a particular shareholder type dominates control transfers we examine
the transaction partners more closely. For listed firms, we find that most control blocks are
sold by non-financial firms (33.2%) and individuals (29.3%). In turn, the largest number
of control blocks is purchased by non-financial firms (41.5%) and individuals (25.9%).
Compared to the fraction of listed firms under ultimate ownership of non-financial firms
(28.6%) and individuals (42.4%), it becomes clear that non-financial firms trade control
blocks more often than would be expected by their frequency as ultimate owners. In
comparison with all other shareholder types, non-financial firms are the most active traders
of control blocks. For non-listed firms, non-financial firms buy an even larger fraction of
control blocks (56.8%), more than three times the fraction individuals purchase.
5 Causes and consequences of control transfers
In the following we analyze the causes and consequences of changes in ultimate ownership.
The aim is to test the hypotheses lined out in Section 2. All results derived in this section
are based on bivariate analyses, and any causal interpretation we give to correlations
between variables is in the sense of Granger (1969).
To identify the causes and consequences of control transfers, we compare firms that
experience a change in ultimate ownership with firms that do not experience such a
change in any of the sample years, based on various firm characteristics. Specifically, we
calculate the mean of each firm characteristic for the year of control change (year 0) as
well as for the two years preceding (year -1, year -2) or following this change (year 1, year
2). Our benchmark are firms that do not experience a control transfer in any of the sample
years, or more exactly, the characteristics’ average over all sample years for these firms.7
The analysis is based on Sample II, which contains firms with at least four continuous
years of data.
5.1 Causes of control transfers
To examine the causes of control transfers, we compare firms on measures of ownership
structure, capital structure, size, and performance. Tables 8 and 9 investigate the diffe-
rences between firms with (columns 2 and 4) and without (columns 1 and 3) a change in
control, separately for listed and non-listed firms. Three consecutive years are considered:
the year in which the change in ultimate ownership occurs (year 0), and the two years
prior to this change (year -1 and year -2).
Table 8 shows that firms experiencing a change in control differ significantly from firms
not experiencing such a change on a range of characteristics. These differences are obser-
ved for listed as well as non-listed firms; often it is only the level of the respective firm
characteristic that differs between both types of firms. We find that ownership concentra-
tion is significantly smaller for firms in which the ultimate owner changes. For listed firms,
one year prior to the change in control the average size of the largest block is 50.7%, but
7 All results are qualitatively similar when we compare firms at the characteristics’ median instead.
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62.7% in firms without a transfer of corporate control. For non-listed firms, the difference
in ownership concentration is also significant, but the average size of the largest block is
much larger. Similarly, we find that changes in control are less likely to occur for firms
that are under control of an ultimate owner than for firms that are not under control of an
ultimate owner. This is strong empirical support for Hypothesis H1: Changes in ultimate
ownership are less likely for firms with high ownership concentration.
We also find strong support for Hypothesis H2 that highly leveraged firms are more
likely to experience a change in control. Listed as well as non-listed firms for which we
observe a change in ultimate ownership show a significantly larger burden of debt than
other firms. This result is robust when interest coverage or the borrowing ratio are used
as alternative measures of leverage. Regarding complexity of ownership, the results in
Table 8 indicate that the level at which the ultimate owner is located is important. For
non-listed firms, this level is significantly lower prior to a change in ultimate ownership.
Therefore non-listed firms controlled through pyramids are less likely to experience a
change in control. In turn, for listed firms the level of control is significantly higher after
the change. This suggests that listed firms tend to be controlled through a pyramid after a
change in control. To investigate how changes in ownership are related to cross ownership,
we define a variable indicating whether a sample firm is ultimately controlled by a firm
belonging to the well-known web of financial and non-financial German firms, similar to
Wenger and Kaserer (1998). This web consists of the five largest commercial German
banks, two large insurance companies, as well as large non-financial firms such as Linde
AG, Siemens AG, and VIAG AG. The analysis shows that firms experiencing a change
in ultimate ownership are less likely to be under control of a web firm (not tabled), but
the difference is not statistically significant. Summarizing, there is evidence supporting
Hypothesis H3 that complex ownership structures make a change in control less likely,
but only for non-listed firms. In turn, listed firms tend to become integrated in pyramids
after a change in ownership.
Larger firms, whether listed or not, are significantly less likely to be exposed to a change
in ultimate ownership (Table 8). For example, we find that listed firms in which the ul-
timate owner does not change are about 80% larger in terms of sales than listed firms
experiencing a change in control. Analogous differences are found when using total assets
or the number of employees as measures of firm size. This is strong support for Hypothesis
H4. Concerning the role of insider ownership, insiders (executive and non-executive direc-
tors) own a significantly lower fraction of shares in listed firms that experience a change
in control. In addition, insider ownership falls considerably in listed as well as non-listed
firms when ultimate ownership changes. For example, in non-listed firms it drops from an
average of 10.3% to 5.4%. An F -test shows that this difference is statistically significant at
the 0.10 level. This indicates that insiders tend to sell out in control transactions. Hence,
for listed firms there is strong evidence supporting Hypothesis H5: Changes in ultimate
ownership are less likely when insider ownership is high.
As a last cause of control changes we consider performance. To check for robustness
we examine several measures of performance: return on assets (ROA), return on equity
(ROE), the change in ROA, the change in ROE, the fraction of firms reporting an earnings
loss, and annual stock market return. All measures except the loss indicator are corrected
for median performance at the two-digit industry level.8
8 We also calculated performance relative to median returns in the same accounting year. For non-
listed firms, the obtained results suggest a stronger effect of poor performance on changes in ultimate
ownership than the results reported in Table 9.
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Table 9 suggests that poor performance is not related to changes in ultimate ownership.
Only listed firms that report an earnings loss are significantly more likely to experience
a change in control. For non-listed firms we do not find evidence that performance is
particularly poor before a change in control occurs. Accounting returns appear to be so-
mewhat lower one year preceding the change; however, the difference in industry-adjusted
performance to firms without a change in control is insignificant. Only in the year of
control change performance of non-listed is significantly smaller. One reason for this lack
of evidence regarding performance can be that our sample contains systematically fewer
poorly performing non-listed firms (see Section 3.2). If poor performance makes a change
in control more likely and these firms disappear from the sample due to a takeover, this
will bias any observed relation between performance and the likelihood for a change in
control towards zero. In summary, our data confirm Hypothesis H6, but only for listed
firms with very poor performance. This result does not necessarily stand in contrast to our
finding that stock market returns are significantly higher one year before control changes.
To the contrary, this might indicate that control transfers are anticipated and perceived
as value-enhancing events.
5.2 Consequences of control transfers
In the following we analyze the consequences of control transfers. Again, we compare
firms that experience a change in ultimate ownership with firms that do not experience
such a change in any of the sample years. Effects on governance changes and corporate
restructuring are discussed in Section 5.2.1 and effects on performance in Section 5.2.2.
5.2.1 Governance changes and corporate restructuring
Table 10 describes how management turnover, asset divestitures, employment growth, and
labor costs evolve in firms that experience a change in control. All figures are calculated
for the year of ultimate ownership change (year 0), the two following years (year 1 and
year 2), and the year prior to the change (year -1).
For listed and non-listed firms we observe a strong increase in management turnover.
For example, for listed firms that experience a change in control CEO turnover rates
more than double from 10.2% in the year preceding the change to 21.1% in the year
of change (Table 10). This turnover rate is significantly above average CEO turnover in
listed firms without a change in ultimate ownership. For non-listed firms we find a similar
increase in CEO turnover following the control change. The increase in management
turnover is consistent with Denis and Sarin (1999) who find that US firms experiencing
large increases or decreases in insider ownership show CEO turnover rates of 15%-20%; in
contrast, small changes in ownership are associated with turnover rates of only 8%. Hence,
a CEO turnover rate of 14%, which we find for German listed firms not experiencing a
change in control, is comparatively high. Partially this difference might be explained by the
fact that our turnover data include CEOs leaving the board voluntarily. Unfortunately, for
Germany no consistent data are available on voluntary or forced management resignation.
Similar to CEO turnover, the replacement rate of executive directors increases considera-
bly following control transfers (Table 10). For the supervisory board, which in Germany
is separated from the management board, we find turnover rates for the chairman and
the other board members (not tabled) that are above those reported for the management
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board. These findings strongly support HypothesisH7 that changes in ultimate ownership
are followed by increases in management (and supervisory) board turnover.
Asset divestitures also increase in control transfers; this increase is significant for sales
of fixed assets, but only for listed firms (Table 10). Specifically, for listed firms we find that
sales rates of fixed assets increase from 6.9% in year -1 to 8.8% in year 0. The difference in
the rate of asset sales to firms without a change in control is significant at the 0.05 level.
For non-listed firms, we also observe an increase in sales of fixed and financial assets, but
the difference to firms without a change in ultimate ownership is insignificant. Concerning
employment, we find that in the second year after the control transfer the average growth
rate of employment is negative for listed and non-listed firms, but the difference in growth
rates between firms with and without a change in control is significant only for listed firms.
Hence, employee layoffs increase, but not before two years after the change in control. This
time lag suggests that adjustment costs play an important role in reorganizing a firm.
Whereas there is evidence for asset divestitures and layoffs, we find no evidence of cost
cutting. On the contrary, labor costs per employee do not decline, but increase after a
change in ultimate ownership. This suggests that the new owner is working to impro-
ve incentives for employees. Overall, the empirical evidence on corporate restructuring
supports Hypothesis H8, but only for listed firms.
5.2.2 Effects on performance
As a last consequence we examine the impact of control changes on performance. If there
is any impact, then it should be most visible for firms that previously experienced a
decline in performance. The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we compare firms that
perform worse than their industry peers in year -1 and experience a change in control in
year 0, with median industry performance. Table 11 reports the difference in performance,
starting with the year of poor performance (year -1) through the three following years
(columns 1 and 2). For robustness, various performance measures are used. We recognize
that requiring four continuous years of data potentially induces a selection bias. As shown
in Section 3.2, this does not cause a selection bias for listed firms. For non-listed firms, our
sample contains systematically fewer poorly performing firms; but this should bias any
observed relation between control transfer and performance improvement towards zero.
In the second step of analysis, we compare firms that perform worse than their industry
peers in year -1 and experience a change in control in year 0, with those that also perform
worse than their industry peers in year -1 but did not experience such a change in any
year. The reason is that selecting only poorly performing firms to examine performance
improvements could induce a second type of selection bias, particularly if there is mean
reversion in our performance measures. If this is the case, performance should improve
irrespective whether followed by a change in control or not. Table 11 reports the difference
in performance, starting with the year of poor performance (year -1) through the three
following years (columns 3 and 4). Poor performance is defined as the respective measure
being below its median in the same two-digit industry in year -1.
Table 11 suggests that performance of listed and non-listed poorly performing firms
adjusts to the industry benchmark after they experience a change in control. For example,
we find that industry-adjusted return on assets, which by definition is negative in year
-1 (-4.8%), improves to 0.4% in the second year after the change in control. Comparing
the levels of performance in year 2 and in year -1 we ascertain that performance improves
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significantly (difference in levels not reported). We find analogous results using alternative
measures of performance.
The observed improvement in performance does not necessarily have to be caused by
a change in control. As noted above, it might be due to mean reversion. Table 11 shows
that for firms performing poorly in year -1 and experiencing a control transfer in year
0 the improvement in performance is stronger than for firms performing poorly in year
-1 without a subsequent control transfer. However, this difference in performance im-
provement is insignificant. Hence, after taking into account potential bias resulting from
mean reversion, we do not find evidence that performance improves particularly following
control transfers. This result holds for listed as well as non-listed firms. We must reject
Hypothesis H9. Note, however, that major improvements in performance might become
visible only three or more years after a change in control. Unfortunately, our data set is
too small for this exercise because requiring five or more continuous years of data would
leave too few observations.
6 Conclusions
This paper sheds light on the market for corporate control in Germany. It provides evi-
dence on the size of this market, as well as the causes and consequences of control transfers.
We find that Germany has an active market for large share blocks. For listed firms, a new
shareholder purchases a block larger than ten percent in 9.9% of sample firms, on average
through the years 1987–1994. This rate of block purchases compares to 12.4% for Belgium
(Renneboog, 2000) and 9.0% for the UK (Franks et al., 1999). For the US, Bethel et al.
(1998) report a rate of 6.6% for blocks larger than five percent. Hence, the frequency of
block trades in Germany is similar to other countries. For non-listed firms, the respective
rate is 7.0%; no comparable figures from other countries are available. The vast majority
of block trades leads to changes in ultimate ownership (control transfers). Taking into
account only block trades that lead to a control transfer, we find annual rates of 8.3% for
listed firms and 6.0% for non-listed firms. The most active traders of control blocks are
non-financial firms and to a lesser extent individuals.
We find that control transfers are more likely for firms with high leverage, but less likely
for larger firms and firms with high concentration of ownership. In addition, high insider
ownership and complex ownership structures make control transfers less likely for listed
and non-listed firms, respectively. Our finding regarding insider ownership is consistent
with evidence from the US (Barber et al., 1995) and Canada (St-Pierre et al., 1996) that
high director ownership is associated with an increase in resistance to ownership changes.
In contrast, our findings regarding performance indicate that the German market for
corporate control works differently compared with the US. Case-study evidence collected
by Denis and Sarin (1999) suggests that poor performance is often the impetus for the
purchase of large blocks. For Germany we find that control changes are related to poor
performance as well, but only when performance is very poor and only for listed firms.
This suggests that changes in ownership tend to occur when the firm’s regular governance
mechanisms (such as board control) fail.
Changes in ultimate ownership are followed by increased management and supervisory
board turnover. For listed firms, asset divestitures and employee layoffs increase after a
change in control. In contrast, there is no evidence of cost cutting as labor costs per
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employee tend to increase after control transfers. Regarding management turnover, our
results are consistent with evidence from Belgium (Renneboog, 2000) and the US (Denis
and Sarin, 1999). Concerning asset restructuring, a similar impact has been reported
for the US (Bethel et al., 1998; Denis and Sarin, 1999; Denis and Kruse, 2000). Our
results have implications for the speed of organizational change. Kole and Lehn (1999)
show for the US airline industry that internal governance structures adjust gradually
after deregulation. In contrast, we find that CEO turnover occurs rapidly after a change
in ownership. Hence, changes in external governance structures serve as a catalyst for
organizational adaptation.
In contrast, we do not find evidence that control changes are followed by improve-
ments in performance, irrespective whether we measure performance by accounting- or
market-based returns. This result is at odds with evidence from the US where performance
improves after major changes in ownership (Bethel et al., 1998; Denis and Kruse, 2000).
Furthermore, we find that important causes and consequences of control transfers are
different for listed and non-listed firms. Specifically, complex ownership structures limit
control changes for non-listed firms. This indicates that empirical studies examining only
listed firms tend to underestimate the impact of ownership complexity on control trans-
fers. Regarding restructuring, we cannot find evidence of asset divestitures or layoffs for
non-listed firms. This indicates that studies focusing on listed firms tend to overestimate
the impact of control transfers on restructuring. Our finding that control transfers are
preceded by poor performance only for listed firms suggests that factors other than per-
formance motivate ownership changes in non-listed firms. Whether this is so for other
countries as well, or which factors this could be are open questions. The main lesson is
that empirical analyses should consider listed as well as non-listed firms because important
aspects of the control transfer process work differently. Table 12 summarizes the empiri-
cal evidence gathered in this study. Note that any causal relation we give to correlations
between variables is in the sense of Granger (1969). A possible extension of the present
study is to examine control transfers in a multivariate framework.
From the methodological point of view, the existence of a significant market for corpo-
rate control has important implications for the design of empirical studies on corporate
governance. As ownership structures are not stable over time, it is not sufficient to use
cross-section data on ownership to explain variation in performance because any unobser-
ved variation in ownership will be included in the error term (see also Denis and Sarin,
1999; Bo¨rsch-Supan and Ko¨ke, 2000). But correlation of the error term with (observed)
cross-section data on ownership will cause coefficients to be biased and inconsistent. Li-
kewise, explaining firm performance without data on ownership, but instead applying
fixed-effect models to account for unobserved firm heterogeneity will also result in biased
and inconsistent coefficients, because unobserved (ownership) variables are not fixed over
time. Hence, results of previous studies using either cross sections of ownership data or
no ownership data are likely to be biased.
Finally, one policy implication of this study is that the currently proposed new Law on
Securities Purchases and Takeovers will not cover a large part of control transactions in
Germany because it extends only to listed firms. But the frequency of control transfers
is similar for listed and non-listed firms. Prudent regulation governing the process of
changes in corporate ownership will become even more urgent when from the year 2002
on German corporations are allowed to sell their substantial stakes in other companies
without taxation of the realized profits. This measure is expected to increase the frequency
of acquisitions and divestitures considerably.
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Appendix
The first main pillar of data comes from Hoppenstedt’s Balance Sheet Database (BSD).
An important feature of this data source is that it contains information on listed and non-
listed corporations, both public (AG) and private (GmbH) (see also Table 1). We take
1986 as the starting year because a change in disclosure rules hinders comparability of the
annual reports before and after the year 1986.9 The last year of the sample is 1994 because
publication of our main source of ownership data has been discontinued in this year. For
the period 1986–1994, BSD contains 5,222 firms (22,732 firm years) for which consolidated
balance sheet data are available (Table 13). We eliminate firms from the utility, traffic, and
telecommunications industries because they were still predominantly government-owned
during the period of observation. As a matter of comparability, we also eliminate firms
that primarily operate in the banking and insurance business, while operating little in
non-financial activities. Selection by industry causes 1,752 firm deletions.
The second main pillar – data on ownership structures – is obtained from annual reports
published by Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechsel-Bank (in short, Hypobank). These re-
ports contain information on direct ownership of common stock (Stammaktien) for all
listed German corporations. In addition, Hypobank provides information on direct ow-
nership of common stock for large non-listed corporations (Stammaktien for the non-listed
AG and Gesellschafteranteile for the GmbH which cannot be listed). Hypobank reports
the size and the name of a direct owner when the size of the ownership block exceeds
five percent. In general, ownership rights as reported by Hypobank correspond to voting
rights (see Section 3.3).
Ownership information from Hypobank cannot readily be used in our analysis for three
reasons. First, ownership information from Hypobank only refers to the direct level of
owners. But this analysis requires to identify the ultimate owner of each sample firm. In
contrast to Becht and Bo¨hmer (2000), who rely on voting rights information provided by
the German Securities Exchange Commission (Bundesaufsichtsamt fu¨r den Wertpapier-
handel),10 this study reconstructs voting rights information in a bottom-up approach from
information on direct ownership rights. Our concept of control, as outlined in Section 3.3,
represents the methodological tool to achieve this aim. A second drawback is that Hy-
pobank does not directly reveal ownership information on medium-sized non-listed firms.
Other commercial data sources are also of little help because during our period of obser-
vation, non-listed firms have not been subject to strictly enforced disclosure requirements.
Therefore, we construct the relevant ownership structures by searching the information
on investments in subsidiaries and affiliated companies, which is given in the appendix
to each company in Hypobank. To further enlarge our sample, we search the Mannheim
Company Database (MUP) located at the ZEW in Mannheim. We thereby obtain owner-
ship structures on many medium-sized non-listed firms, mainly for private corporations
(GmbH). Third, some firms changed their names during the period of observation, for ex-
ample following takeovers or restructuring of conglomerates. Since changes in ownership
are crucial to the data collection procedure, we adjust for name changes and obtain a
panel on ownership structures through the years 1986–1994.
9 In 1985 several changes were introduced in German corporate law (§289HGB), most of them triggered
by the European Community’s Fourth Company Law Directive on the harmonization of national
requirements pertaining to financial statements.
10 See Section 3.3 for a short discussion of this voting rights database.
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In consequence, we are left with ownership data for 1,485 firms (6,367 firm years).
Because of missing values for important balance sheet items, another 30 firms must be
eliminated. This selection procedure generates a sample of 1,455 firms (6,205 firm years)
with at least one year of balance sheet and ownership data during the years 1986–1994.
As this study examines changes in ownership we further eliminate 509 firms for which we
have only one year of data. For almost all of these 509 firms the year 1994 is the single
year. This is due to the fact that Hoppenstedt substantially increased firm coverage in
1994. The resulting sample which contains 946 firms (4,882 firm years) is labeled ’Sample
I’ in this study. For the analysis of causes and consequences of control transfers (Section 5)
we require firms to display at least four continuous years of data. This generates ’Sample
II’ which contains 664 firms (4,443 firm years). In Section 3.2, we analyze whether limiting
the sample to firms with several continuous years of data causes a selection bias. Table
13 summarizes the sample selection procedure.
To test for a potential sample selection bias, we collect data on the firms’ survival
status. For firms leaving the sample before 1994, information is obtained from the BSD
and MUP databases and from telephone interviews. We find that 39 out of 65 firms that
exit the sample before 1994 still existed in 1994 without a change in ultimate ownership,
but simply changed their name or quit reporting due to reasons determined within the
firm. In 11 cases operation was shut down due to liquidation or bankruptcy. In 14 cases
the respective firm had been taken over by another entity. And in one case operation was
shut down voluntarily. Hence, 60% of firm exits during the sample period are not related
to firm failure or acquisition.
We recognize that the selection procedure of non-listed medium-sized firms does not
generate a random sample of non-listed medium-sized German firms. Given that we in-
clude only medium-sized firms that are subsidiaries of conglomerates, our sample might
be biased. For example, we lack medium-sized firms that are directly owned by families.
But given the advantage of a smaller average firm size in the total sample we regard this
as a necessary cost to be incurred. Further, if agency problems do exist, they should be
most pronounced in our sample firms.
All variables used in this study are defined in Table 14.
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Table 1: Sample representativeness
Sample representativeness regarding coverage of non-listed and listed firms, separately by type
of firm, taking 1992 as the year of reference. Column (1) shows the number of all German
corporations, and column (2) the total number of sample firms (all incorporated), separately for
listed/non-listed public (AG, KGaA) and non-listed private firms (GmbH). Column (3) provides
the fraction of sample firms that are listed or non-listed, separately by legal form. And column
(4) relates the number of sample firms to the number of all German corporations, separately by
type of firm. Data on the number of all German corporations are obtained from Statistisches
Bundesamt, Umsatzsteuerstatistik, Fachserie 14, Reihe 8.
Listing Legal form All German Sample firms (all incorporated)
corporations total in percent of in percent of all
all sample firms German corporations
by type of firm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yes AG, KGaA 521 347 51.5% 66.6%
No AG, KGaA 1,643 228 33.9% 13.9%
No GmbH 359,358 98 14.6% 0.03%
Total 361,522 673 100.0% 0.2%
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Table 2: Characteristics of firms with different number of observations
Characteristics of firms with different number of continuous years of data, separately for non-
listed and listed firms. Firms with at least four continuous years of data (Sample II, column
3) are compared with both firms with at least two continuous years of data (Sample I, column
1) and firms with less than four continuous years of data (column 2). Firms are compared at
the mean of each firm characteristic. These include measures of ownership structure (size of
largest share block, fraction of dispersed shares), capital structure (debt-to-assets ratio), firm
size (total sales), and performance (return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), change
in ROA, change in ROE, the fraction of firms reporting an earnings loss, and annual stock
market return). All performance measures except the loss indicator are corrected for median
performance at the two-digit industry level. The test statistics are heteroscedastic t-tests of
equal means. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
The sample comprises 946 firms (Sample I), with 2,460 observations for listed firms and 2,422
observations for non-listed firms.
Firms with at least Firms with less Firms with at least
two continuous years than four continuous four continuous years
of data (Sample I) years of data of data (Sample II)
Non-listed firms:
Size of largest block 85.9%** 88.7%** 84.4%
Fraction of dispersed shares 9.3%** 6.9%** 10.5%
Debt-to-assets ratio 39.0% 45.9%*** 38.2%
Return on assets (ROA) 0.7% -4.4%*** 0.8%
Return on equity (ROE) 1.3% -9.5%*** 1.0%
Change in ROA 0.0% -0.9% -0.2%
Change in ROE 0.2% -3.6% -0.4%
Earnings loss 14.1% 29.8%*** 12.9%
Sales (in mio. DM) 2,146.7 371.4*** 2,369.3
Number of observations 2,422 181 2,012
Listed firms:
Size of largest block 60.6% 65.9% 60.6%
Fraction of dispersed shares 31.5% 32.1% 31.5%
Debt-to-assets ratio 41.3% 41.8% 41.2%
Return on assets (ROA) 1.4% 1.7% 1.4%
Return on equity (ROE) 1.6% -4.0% 1.8%
Change in ROA -0.3% -1.8% -0.3%
Change in ROA -0.8% -8.9% -0.6%
Earnings loss 9.3% 11.1% 9.3%
Stock market return 2.4% -0.8% 2.4%
Sales (in mio. DM) 3,346.9 590.5*** 3,392.2
Number of observations 2,460 18 2,421
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Table 3: Characteristics of entering and exiting firms
Characteristics of firms entering the sample after 1987, the first year of the sample, or exiting
the sample before 1994, the last year of the sample, compared with characteristics of firms that
do not enter or exit the sample, separately for non-listed and listed firms. For firms entering in
year t, the comparison group is firms in year t that are in the sample at least since year t−1. Vice
versa, for firms exiting the sample at the end of year t, the comparison group is firms in year t that
are still in the sample in year t+1. Firms are compared at the mean of each firm characteristic.
These include measures of ownership structure (size of largest share block, fraction of dispersed
shares), capital structure (debt-to-assets ratio), firm size (total sales), and performance (return
on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), change in ROA, change in ROE, the fraction of firms
reporting an earnings loss, and annual stock market return). All performance measures except
the loss indicator are corrected for median performance at the two-digit industry level. The
test statistics are heteroscedastic t-tests of equal means. *, **, *** indicates significance at the
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. The sample comprises 946 firms (Sample I), with 2,460
observations for listed firms and 2,422 observations for non-listed firms.
Entry analysis Exit analysis
Firms Firms in Firms Firms still
entering sample at least exiting at end in sample
in year t since year t− 1 of year t in year t+ 1
Non-listed firms:
Size of largest block 89.1% 85.7%*** 82.1% 84.8%
Fraction of dispersed shares 6.9% 9.5%*** 14.8% 10.3%
Debt-to-assets ratio 43.8% 37.9%*** 47.2% 37.8%**
Return on assets (ROA) 0.1% 0.8% -0.4% 1.0%
Return on equity (ROE) 1.7% 1.3% -3.9% 1.6%
Change in ROA 0.9% -0.2%* 2.3% -0.4%
Change in ROE 1.7% -0.2% -1.3% -0.6%
Earnings loss 20.0% 13.0%*** 19.3% 12.3%
Sales (in mio. DM) 1,109.3 2,430.3*** 798.7 2,334.7***
Number of observations 448 1,842 60 1,842
Listed firms:
Size of largest block 67.3% 60.8%*** 84.0% 60.3%*
Fraction of dispersed shares 26.7% 31.3%** 16.0% 31.6%
Debt-to-assets ratio 41.0% 41.6% 41.1% 41.2%
Return on assets (ROA) 4.6% 1.2%*** 0.1% 1.5%
Return on equity (ROE) 6.9% 1.3%*** 0.2% 1.8%
Change in ROA 0.4% -0.3% 4.6% -0.6%
Change in ROE 0.4% -0.9% 3.3% -1.6%
Earnings loss 3.5% 10.1%*** 20.0% 8.9%
Stock market return 12.7% 4.5%** 6.7% 4.1%
Sales (in mio. DM) 843.2 3,546.7*** 28.6 3,325.3***
Number of observations 171 2,094 5 2,094
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Table 4: Ownership concentration
Ownership concentration calculated as sample average in a given year for the period 1987–
1994, separately for non-listed and listed firms. Measures of ownership concentration include the
average size of the largest share block, the average sum of the three largest share blocks, and the
fraction of firms for which an ultimate owner can be identified applying the concept of control.
The size of the largest block and the sum of the three largest blocks are calculated at the direct
level of ownership. The sample comprises 946 firms (Sample I).
Non-listed firms Listed firms
Size of Sum of Fraction of Size of Sum of Fraction of
largest 3 largest firms with largest 3 largest firms with
block blocks ultimate owner block blocks ultimate owner
1987 78.1% 81.4% 92.4% 53.1% 55.8% 75.4%
1988 82.0% 84.4% 94.0% 57.7% 60.1% 78.0%
1989 83.8% 85.7% 94.1% 59.7% 62.1% 80.0%
1990 84.1% 85.7% 93.8% 60.5% 62.9% 82.4%
1991 84.6% 86.2% 95.1% 61.6% 64.1% 82.0%
1992 87.0% 88.2% 96.3% 62.5% 64.7% 82.4%
1993 88.2% 89.6% 96.3% 63.5% 65.5% 83.8%
1994 90.3% 92.1% 95.8% 61.9% 64.6% 84.2%
Average 85.9% 87.7% 95.0% 60.6% 63.0% 81.5%
Correlation 0.51 0.37 1.00 0.61 0.68 1.00
with Control
Table 5: Ownership of large share blocks by type of ultimate owner
Ownership of large share blocks by type of ultimate owner as sample average for the period
1987–1994, separately for non-listed and listed firms. For each share block on the direct level
of ownership, the type of the ultimate owner is identified applying the concept of control. Se-
cond, for each firm the distribution of share blocks across five categories of the ultimate owner
is determined, using block size at the direct level. Third, sample distribution of share blocks
across categories is calculated as the average across all firm years. The five categories of the
ultimate owner are: individuals (families, partnerships (Personengesellschaften), foundations),
non-financial firms, financial firms (banks, insurance companies, investment funds), government
authorities, and dispersed shares (shares not held in a block). Insiders are executive and non-
executive directors. The sample comprises 946 firms (Sample I).
Individuals Financial Non-fin. Government Dispersed Total
firms firms shares
total insiders
Non-listed firms 30.7% 12.0% 9.2% 48.6% 4.7% 9.3% 100%
Listed firms 36.8% 22.5% 9.2% 24.0% 1.9% 31.5% 100%
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Table 6: Purchases and sales of large share blocks
Average fraction of shares purchased by new shareholders (columns 1 and 4), purchased by old
shareholders (columns 2 and 5), and sold by old shareholders (column 3 and 6) in any given
year for the period 1987–1994, separately for non-listed and listed firms. First, the ultimate
owner of each direct share block is identified. Second, the names of those ultimate owners are
compared year by year and annual changes in individual shareholders are aggregated into the
three categories. Third, for each of the three measures the average across all firm years is
determined. The sample comprises 946 firms (Sample I).
Non-listed firms Listed firms
Increases Increases Decreases Increases Increases Decreases
by new by old by old by new by old by old
shareholders shareholders shareholders shareholders shareholders shareholders
1987 6.9% 0.8% 7.5% 7.7% 1.6% 7.7%
1988 3.9% 1.3% 3.9% 2.7% 1.5% 3.3%
1989 7.7% 1.3% 8.0% 5.6% 1.8% 5.6%
1990 7.4% 0.8% 8.6% 5.0% 1.7% 6.4%
1991 1.6% 1.1% 2.0% 4.8% 1.6% 5.0%
1992 4.3% 1.4% 4.6% 2.6% 1.7% 4.1%
1993 1.2% 0.7% 1.7% 3.1% 1.3% 3.1%
1994 6.8% 1.4% 6.5% 5.3% 1.3% 8.8%
Average 4.9% 1.1% 5.2% 4.4% 1.5% 5.4%
Table 7: Size distribution of blocks purchased by new shareholders
Size distribution of blocks that are purchased by a new shareholder for the period 1987–1994,
separately for non-listed and listed firms. Block size is observed at the direct level of ownership,
block ownership is determined at the ultimate level, applying the concept of control. Therefore,
purchases by new shareholders refer to changes in ultimate ownership of direct share blocks.
Column 1 shows the total number of block purchases by new shareholders. Columns 2, 4, 6, and
8 disaggregate these purchases into four size classes. Columns 3, 5, 7, and 9 relate the disaggregate
number of blocks to the number of all block purchases by new shareholders (column 1). The
sample comprises 946 firms (Sample I).
Total number Size of purchased block
of purchases [5%; 10%[ [10%; 25%[ [25%; 50%[ [50%; 100%]
total % total % total % total %
Non-listed firms 178 6 3.4% 24 13.5% 21 11.8% 125 70.2%
Listed firms 258 11 4.3% 74 28.7% 62 24.0% 107 41.5%
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Table 8: Causes of control transfers
Characteristics of firms that experience a change in ultimate ownership (control) in year 0
(columns 2 and 4), compared with characteristics of firms that do not experience such a change
in any year (columns 1 and 3), separately for non-listed and listed firms. Firms are compared at
the mean of each firm characteristic. For firms with a change in control, statistics are calculated
for the two years preceding the change (year -1 and year -2) and the year of change (year 0).
For other firms, statistics refer to the whole period of observation. Firm characteristics include
measures of ownership structure (size of largest share block, level in ownership pyramid where
control is located, fraction of insider ownership), capital structure (debt-to-assets ratio), and
firm size (total sales). The test statistics are heteroscedastic t-tests of equal means. *, **, ***
indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. The sample comprises 664
firms (Sample II).
Non-listed firms Listed firms
No change Change in No change Change in
in control control in control control
Largest block year -2 69.4%*** 50.2%***
year -1 70.8%*** 50.7%***
year 0 87.5% 76.5%*** 62.7% 55.1%***
Debt-to-assets ratio year -2 40.9%* 44.5%***
year -1 41.9%** 46.0%***
year 0 36.9% 41.9%** 39.9% 45.1%***
Level of control year -2 1.6*** 1.4
year -1 1.7* 1.4
year 0 1.9 2.0 1.4 1.7***
Sales (in mio. DM) year -2 1,541.7** 1,975.4***
year -1 1,592.5** 2,042.7***
year 0 2,404.1 1,557.6** 4,030.3 2,245.0***
Insider ownership year -2 12.6% 14.6%***
year -1 10.3% 12.2%***
year 0 13.5% 5.4%*** 27.3% 9.7%***
Number of observations 1,391 621 1,443 978
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Table 9: Industry-adjusted performance as cause of control transfers
Mean industry-adjusted performance of firms that experience a change in ultimate ownership
(control) in year 0 (columns 2 and 4), compared with performance of firms that do not experience
such a change in any year (columns 1 and 3), separately for non-listed and listed firms. For firms
with a change in control, statistics are calculated for the two years preceding the change (year
-1 and year -2) and the year of change (year 0). For other firms, statistics refer to the whole
period of observation. Performance measures include return on assets (ROA), return on equity
(ROE), change in ROA, change in ROE, the fraction of firms reporting an earnings loss, and
annual stock market return. All performance measures except the loss indicator are corrected for
median performance at the two-digit industry level. The test statistics are heteroscedastic t-tests
of equal means. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
The sample comprises 664 firms (Sample II).
Non-listed firms Listed firms
No change Change in No change Change in
in control control in control control
Return on assets (ROA) year -2 1.3% 1.3%
year -1 0.3% 0.8%
year 0 0.9% -1.0% 1.8% 0.9%
Return on equity (ROE) year -2 1.7% 2.8%
year -1 -0.3% 2.7%
year 0 1.4% -4.6%** 2.1% 0.1%
Change in ROA year -2 -0.7% -1.8%*
year -1 -1.4% -0.4%
year 0 -0.1% -2.2%* -0.4% 0.0%
Change in ROE year -2 -0.3% -3.4%
year -1 -2.3% -0.9%
year 0 -0.2% -5.8%** -0.6% -3.0%
Earnings loss year -2 6.2%** 9.9%
year -1 12.4% 13.7%**
year 0 13.8% 15.5% 8.0% 11.8%*
Stock market return year -2 0.1%
year -1 13.3%***
year 0 1.8% 7.1%
Number of observations 1,391 621 1,443 978
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Table 10: Governance changes and corporate restructuring following control transfers
Characteristics of firms that experience a change in ultimate ownership (control) in year 0
(columns 2 and 4), compared with characteristics of firms that do not experience such a change
in any year (columns 1 and 3), separately for non-listed and listed firms. Firms are compared at
the mean of each firm characteristic. For firms with a change in control, statistics are calculated
for the year preceding the change (year -1), the year of change (year 0), and the two years
following the change (year 1 and year 2). For other firms, statistics refer to the whole period of
observation. Firm characteristics include measures of governance changes (turnover rates of the
CEO and executive directors), asset divestitures (sales rates of fixed and financial assets), layoffs
(growth rate of employment), and cost cutting (growth rate of labor costs). The test statistics
are heteroscedastic t-tests of equal means. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01 levels, respectively. The sample comprises 664 firms (Sample II).
Non-listed firms Listed firms
No change Change in No change Change in
in control control in control control
Turnover of CEO year -1 12.8% 10.2%
year 0 14.2% 17.9% 14.0% 21.1%**
year 1 25.6%** 19.5%*
year 2 20.5% 21.1%**
Turnover of executive year -1 11.2% 10.9%
directors year 0 11.5% 20.6%*** 11.9% 19.6%***
year 1 23.4%*** 15.8%*
year 2 16.2% 16.5%**
Sales of fixed assets year -1 6.0% 6.9%
year 0 6.6% 5.2%* 6.2% 8.8%**
year 1 8.5% 7.4%
year 2 5.8% 7.3%
Sales of financial assets year -1 12.1% 16.5%
year 0 14.8% 16.7% 16.2% 20.0%
year 1 13.8% 18.6%
year 2 17.7% 17.4%
Growth rate of employment year -1 -0.1% 4.6%
year 0 -1.3% -3.2% 4.6% 5.5%
year 1 1.1% 1.1%
year 2 -3.2% -2.0%***
Growth rate of labor costs year -1 3.3%** 4.6%
year 0 6.4% 4.9% 4.6% 4.3%
year 1 13.6%** 10.9%**
year 2 6.8% 4.3%
Number of observations 1,391 621 1,443 978
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Table 11: Industry-adjusted performance following poor performance
Mean industry-adjusted performance of firms that perform poorly in year -1 and that experience
a change in ultimate ownership (control) in year 0, but not in years -1, 1, and 2, relative to zero
(columns 1 and 2). Mean industry-adjusted performance of firms that perform poorly in year -1
and that experience a change in control in year 0, but not in years -1, 1, and 2, relative to mean
industry-adjusted performance of firms that perform poorly in year -1 and do not experience
such a change in any year (columns 3 and 4). Poor performance is defined as negative industry-
adjusted performance. The statistics are calculated separately for non-listed and listed firms.
Performance measures include return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), change in ROA,
change in ROE, and annual stock market return. All performance measures are corrected for
median performance at the two-digit industry level. The test statistics are t-tests of being equal
to zero (columns 1 and 2) and heteroscedastic t-tests of equal means (columns 3 and 4). *, **,
*** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. The sample comprises
55 firms from Sample II for which the above conditions hold.
Performance measure Relative to zero Relative to performance of
firms without a change
in control
Non-listed Listed Non-listed Listed
firms firms firms firms
Return on assets (ROA) year -1 -5.0%*** -4.8%*** 0.9% 0.0%
year 0 -4.9%*** -3.4% -0.7% -0.7%
year 1 -2.3%* -2.7%*** 1.4% -0.4%
year 2 -2.3%* 0.4% 0.7% 2.6%
Return on equity (ROE) year -1 -10.6%*** -10.6%*** 0.2% -1.3%
year 0 -11.3%*** -10.2%** -3.0% -4.3%
year 1 -4.0%* -6.9%* 2.7% -1.6%
year 2 -2.3% -3.1% 3.7% 2.5%
Change in ROA year -1 -5.3%*** -4.3%*** -0.6% -0.1%
year 0 -0.6% 1.2% -1.1% 1.3%
year 1 3.3%* -0.3% 3.8%** -0.4%
year 2 0.0% 1.1% -0.5% 1.1%
Change in ROE year -1 -9.1%*** -8.9%*** 0.6% -0.8%
year 0 -0.8% -1.2% -1.7% -1.3%
year 1 6.3% 3.3% 6.4% 2.4%
year 2 1.4% 3.5% 0.2% 3.8%
Stock market return year -1 -22.7%*** 1.8%
year 0 -1.5% -4.6%
year 1 -7.0% -15.4%
year 2 0.5% 1.6%
Number of observations 104 116 104 116
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Table 12: Hypotheses and empirical results
Summary of hypotheses put forward in Section 2 and empirical results obtained in Section 5.
Non-listed firms Listed firms
Changes in ultimate ownership are...
Hypothesis 1 ...less likely for firms with high supported supported
concentration of ownership.
Hypothesis 2 ...more likely for firms with high supported supported
leverage.
Hypothesis 3 ...less likely for firms with complex supported rejected
ownership structures.
Hypothesis 4 ...less likely for large firms. supported supported
Hypothesis 5 ...less likely for firms with high rejected supported
insider ownership.
Hypothesis 6 ...more likely for firms with poor rejected partly supported
performance.
Changes in ultimate ownership are followed by...
Hypothesis 7 ...increased management turnover. supported supported
Hypothesis 8 ...increased asset divestitures. rejected supported
...increased employee layoffs. rejected supported
...increased cost cutting. rejected rejected
Hypothesis 9 ...improvements in performance. rejected rejected
Table 13: Data selection procedure
Selection criterion Firms Firm years
Consolidated balance sheet data for the years 1986–1994 5,222 22,732
Mining, manufacturing, construction, and trade 3,470 15,148
Ownership data 1,485 6,367
No missing values 1,455 6,205
Sample I (at least two continuous years of data) 946 4,882
Sample II (at least four continuous years of data) 664 4,433
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Table 14: Definition of variables
Performance:
Return on assets (ROA) Earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (EBITDA)/total assets
Return on equity (ROE) EBITDA/total equity
Change in ROA ∆ROAt = ROAt −ROAt−1
Change in ROE ∆ROEt = ROEt −ROEt−1
Earnings loss EBITDA < 0
Stock market return Continuous yearly return Rct =
∑n
w=1
Rcw
n ∗ 52 with continuous
weekly return Rcw = ln(
Kpw
Kpw−1
) with Kpw performance value on
Wednesday of week w. Kpw is corrected for capital changes,
changes of stock’s face value, stock splits, and dividend payments.
Ownership structure:
Largest block Size of largest share block
Insider ownership Fraction of shares owned by executive and non-exec. directors
Level of control Level of the end of a control chain in pyramids. For example,
Level = 1 means that control resides with direct shareholder.
Cross ownership Cross = 1 if ultimate owner is part of the web of firms
identified by Wenger and Kaserer (1998) and if ultimate owner
indirectly owns share block in itself; 0 otherwise
Capital structure:
Debt-to-assets ratio Total debt to total assets
Interest coverage EBITDA/interest payments
Borrowing ratio Interest payments/EBITDA
Board structure:
Turnover of CEO CEOt = 1 if chairman of managerial board (Vorstand)
changes from year t-1 to t, 0 otherwise
Turnover of executive Jt+LtEt+Et−1 with Jt (Lt) number of joining (leaving)
directors executive directors and Et number of executive directors
Restructuring:
Sales of assets sjt =
Sjt
Tjt
with Sjt sales of asset class j in year t and
Tjt stock of asset class j at the beginning of year t
Growth rate of nt =
Nt−Nt−1
Nt−1 with Nt total number of employees in year t
employment
Growth rate of ct =
Ct−Ct−1
Ct−1 with Ct total labor expenditures in year t
labor costs
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